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Abstract
This essay defends the Pragmatist’s call to activism in higher education, understanding it as a necessary 
development of good democratic inquiry. Some criticisms of activism have merit, but I distinguish crass or 
uncritical activism from judicious activism. I then argue that judicious activism in higher education and in 
philosophy is not only defensible, but both called for implicitly in the task of democratic education as well 
as an aspect of what John Dewey has articulated as the supreme intellectual obligation, namely to ensure 
that inquiry is put to use for the benefit of life. 
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Education without social action is a one-sided value because it has no true 
power potential. Social action without education is a weak expression of pure 
energy. Deeds uninformed by educated thought can take false directions. 
When we go into action and confront our adversaries, we must be as armed 
with knowledge as they. Our policies should have the strength of deep analysis 
beneath them to be able to challenge the clever sophistries of our opponents. 
~ Martin Luther King, Jr.1
When we think of activism in higher education, such as in images from the 1960’s or 
in recent conflicts about controversial speakers invited to or disinvited from college 
campuses,2 student leaders come to mind first and foremost. Critics of higher education 
today see college as frivolous, wasteful, or irrelevant, or, ironically, as troublingly activist, 
with a liberal agenda.3 Students are considered young and foolish,4 but it is the professors 
who are the problem, some critics have argued.5 In contrast with faculty members, admin-
istrators are more commonly thought of as company men and women. Secure, tenured 
professors, a privileged few becoming scarcer every year,6 are afforded the protections of 
academic freedom, and some use these protections for activism. There are ways of being 
1 Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968 / 2010), 164. I am 
grateful to Greg Moses for calling my attention to this passage.
2  Evan Gerstmann, “Why This Is No Time for College Students to Turn Their Backs on Free Speech,” 
Forbes.com, February 5, 2019, URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/evangerstmann/2019/02/05/why-
this-is-no-time-for-college-students-to-turn-their-backs-on-free-speech/
3  Neil Gross, Why Are Professors Liberal and Why Do Conservatives Care? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013). 
4  Eric Thomas Weber, “Students’ Flag Request Was ‘Emotional’ but Courageous,” The Clarion 
Ledger (Jackson, MS), October 30, 2015, 2C, https://www.clarionledger.com/story/opinion/
columnists/2015/10/30/students-flag-request-emotional-but-courageous/74885008/. 
5  See especially David Horowitz, The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America 
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2006). See also David Horowitz and Jacob Laksin, 
One-Party Classroom: How Radical Professors at America’s Top Colleges Indoctrinate Students and 
Undermine Our Democracy (New York: Crown Forum Publishing, 2009); Bryan Caplan, The Case 
Against Education: Why the Education System Is a Waste of Time and Money (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2019); Jason Brennan and Phillip Magness, Cracks in the Ivory Tower: The Moral 
Mess of Higher Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
6  Colleen Flaherty, “A Non-Tenure-Track Profession?” InsideHigherEd.com, October 12, 2018, URL: 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/12/about-three-quarters-all-faculty-positions-are-tenure-
track-according-new-aaup. According to Flaherty and an analysis by the American Association of 
University Professors based on 2016 data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, 
“About three-quarters of all faculty positions are off the tenure track.” 
Volume 21, Issue 1-2Essays in Philosophy
31 Essays in Philosophy
an activist that clash with the purposes and expectations of education and scholarship, 
to be sure, but there are ways that do not. In this paper, I will clarify and defend what I 
believe to be ways and methods of engaging in activism that are not only acceptable but 
that are both necessary for good democratic education and aspects of what John Dewey 
called the supreme intellectual obligation. I will refer to the two contrasting  forms of 
activism I have in mind as uncritical activism versus judicious activism. An extension of 
this project could focus on the examination of particular cases of activism, to defend or 
criticize actions or decisions of faculty members, students, administrators, and relevant 
stakeholders. My aim in this paper is to address the broader question of whether or not 
scholars should see themselves as best when sequestered in their ivory towers or engaged 
in dialogue with the wider public about matters that demand public attention or redress.
In what follows, I will begin with what I take democratic activism to be in higher edu-
cation, explaining how and why an obligation to it emerges as a result of democratic 
inquiry. Next, I will explain why some people are worried about activism in colleges and 
schools, as well as in the discipline of philosophy. Then, I will explain the sort and forms 
of what I take to be judicious activism and how it is both acceptable in education as well 
as necessary for the kind of education that democracy requires. Finally, I will explain 
what Dewey called “The Supreme Intellectual Obligation,”7 as well as the consequent 
call to activism that philosophers and our colleagues in other fields should feel in higher 
education. 
Democratic activism in higher education & its intellectual roots
Randy Martin’s essay, “Academic Activism,” opens with two definitions drawn from the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), revealing a conceptual tension between what is consid-
ered academic and what is called active.8 He notes that “Academic” is defined in the OED 
as “Not leading to a decision; unpractical; theoretical, formal, or conventional.” “Active,” 
by contrast, is defined as “Opposed to contemplative or speculative: Given to outward 
action rather than inward contemplation or speculation; practical; es. With ‘life.’”9 The 
divide we see here is akin to the clash that arises occasionally between the pure or basic 
7  John Dewey, “The Supreme Intellectual Obligation,” Science Education 18 (February 1934): 1-4. 
Republished in The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Later Works, Volume 9, edited by Jo Ann 
Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1934 / 2008), 96-102. The essay was 
originally an address that Dewey delivered before the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. 
8  Randy Martin, “Academic Activism,” Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 
(PMLA) 124, Issue 3 (May, 2009): 838-846.
9  Ibid., 838. 
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scientist and the engineer. At the same time, there is no contradiction in pursuing a 
Ph.D. in engineering. Rather, there are degrees of emphasis on what is theoretical and 
what is practical. The ideal is very often useful for practical work, and theoretical work 
untethered to real life can lack meaningfulness, if no conceivable relation can be found 
between speculation and even a modest potential relation to life or experience. Extremi-
ties of thought about the difference between being active versus being academic help us 
to understand the kinds of motivations that arise when critics want colleges and uni-
versities to be free from ties to practical life. A kind of piety is at work in the belief that 
what is academic should not be dirtied by practicalities. At the same time, the tradition 
of philosophical Pragmatism made the case that the very meaning of our concepts is to 
be understood in terms of the conceivable practical consequences that they bare for life. 
And thus, when scholars engage in inquiry, if it is meaningful, it will bare consequences 
for living and thus obligations on the part of those who inquire to share what they know 
and to advocate for what is right. 
In light of background tensions between being active and being academic, and in rec-
ognition of what it means to engage in meaningful inquiry, a need then arises for un-
derstanding what it means to engage in democratic inquiry in higher education. For 
something to be democratic, I mean that it aims to empower people to be self-directing 
and better off for it, while respecting the good both of the whole and of minorities in 
the community. When I refer to activism in higher education, I mean a kind of publicly 
communicative leadership or advocacy for a cause, whether for change, in thought or 
action, or for the preservation of what is presently more just than a proposed alternative. 
The conceptual tension that Martin presents is felt and raised often in connection with 
the philosophical tradition known as Pragmatism, as if it were untheoretical as an out-
look. Pragmatists typically care about how and why ideas matter for life, what conceiv-
able consequences would come from one belief in contrast with another, or one concep-
tualization rather than an alternative one. Pragmatists often must answer critics who 
believe that to be pragmatic is to be uncritical, to set aside philosophy. In fact, Charles 
Peirce’s founding insight for the Pragmatist tradition was inspired by science, in which 
the meaning of a hypothesis is to be understood in terms of the conceivable consequenc-
es of its being true. If a hypothesis implies no conceivable difference for scientific testing, 
it is essentially meaningless, representing a difference that makes no difference. 
It is worth noting that the pragmatic theory of meaning is reminiscent of the Logical 
Positivist tradition. That tradition is known for claiming that a statement is meaning-
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ful only if it is empirically verifiable.10 The problem for Logical Positivists is that their 
central claim itself is not empirically verifiable, and thus does not hold up to its own 
expectations for meaningfulness. The Pragmatists avoid this mistake, since there are 
conceivable practical consequences to adopting the Pragmatist theory of meaning. For 
one thing, it means that some hypotheses are essentially meaningless or not scientifically 
verifiable. As a consequence, Pragmatists generally abandon questions for which there 
are no conceivable practical consequences for life or belief, focusing on those matters 
for which there are conceivable consequences. This outlook also helps to explain why 
Pragmatists are generally inclined towards public philosophy or activism. In addition, it 
offers an initial way of responding to the a priori reasoning that says that by definition 
philosophy is or academics are impractical. It simply need not be so, even if everyday 
language includes a usage of “merely academic” that refers to what is impractical. It is 
an association that ought to be resisted, except for the good cause of supporting matters 
for which some people are unimaginative or unwilling to entertain theories or think-
ing that is only conceivably relevant to life. I have in mind here especially the arts, but 
even theoretical sciences are sometimes dismissed as unimportant. In Einstein’s day, his 
theories were only conceivably meaningful for experimentation in real life, but today the 
Large Hadron Collider has enabled the testing and confirmation of his theories.11 Thus, 
the fact that a difference might only be conceivable does not mean it will always only 
make a conceptual difference. Things change. In addition, ideas and ideals may not map 
onto the real world exactly, as in the geometric idea of a point, which has no extension. 
Nevertheless, ideas and ideals can direct human action for better or worse results, such 
as in the idea of a perfect circle, an infinite set of points, each with no extension, equi-
distant from a center. That idea may be impossible to map exactly onto the world, yet it 
can teach us how to draw or create more perfect circles than we would have without the 
idea. Here we find a way of bridging the gap between the theoretical or abstract and the 
practical. Perfect circles, like ideas of perfect societies, may be impossible to create in real 
life, yet can be useful for our efforts to engineer more circular objects or to design more 
just social policies. 
An example can help to drive home the point here. Historically, doctors were under-
stood to be authorities over patients and some people were not treated as autonomous 
moral beings who should have the right to make their own medical decisions. Today, we 
have practices and policies in place to protect patients’ autonomy, such that consent is 
10  A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 10. 
11  Don Lincoln, “Einstein’s Theory Was Put to the Test. Guess What Happened,” CNN.com, April 
6, 2019, URL: https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/06/opinions/einstein-theory-tested-super-high-gravity-
lincoln/index.html. 
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understood to be an essential element in medical treatment. Philosophers were involved 
in the development of some of the proposals and reports that have shaped the pres-
ent medical and research-ethics landscape. Where people today are not consulted over 
matters that concern them, and where scholars are aware of such concerns, academics 
would be morally negligent if they were not to speak up in activist fashion, proclaiming 
concern for the humane treatment of people. This is an example of activism. The cause of 
respecting people’s autonomy by means of securing consent may seem mundane today, 
yet the concept of consent remains only superficially understood and still an awkward 
ideal needing refinement for application. For instance, a patient with an 8th grade educa-
tion may sign a form that claims he or she has given consent to a medical procedure, but 
if knowledge and understanding of what he or she is consenting to are relevant to the 
giving of consent, as is generally thought, we have a significant gap between the expec-
tations of consent and what might either be done or be possible in communicating the 
details of what a procedure will involve. A simple relevant case occurred in my life, and 
I have a Ph.D. in Philosophy. A doctor told me that my daughter would go into heart 
failure, and I, at the time, mistakenly thought the condition communicated to me was 
fatal. The heart seems essential as an organ and failure suggests that the essential organ in 
question would not function sufficiently for life. I was wrong, it turned out. Fortunately, 
no decisions that yielded lasting harm were made in my condition of ignorance, but the 
doctor in our case clearly assumed that we knew that heart failure is not fatal. So, the 
future of consent and of what will be needed with respect to advocacy and hence activ-
ism is complex and still in need of work, even with regard to a moral concept that has a 
longstanding, established place in medical practice. 
The insights of philosophers like Charles Peirce and fellow Pragmatist John Dewey show 
us that in the very tasks of public, democratic inquiry, we find cause for attending to the 
consequences of ideas for life. When we note them and attend to them, I argue that there 
inevitably arise obligations as a result, since withholding information that could save 
someone’s life would mean that a scholar bears responsibility for that loss of life. By the 
same token, scholars who understand and fail to speak up about matters such as vaccines 
and other life or death developments are complicit in the deaths that ensue from enabled, 
continuing ignorance.
Why worry about activism in education and philosophy?
Beyond the definitional concern that Randy Martin notes, two further worries can arise 
regarding the notion of activity and academics. One concern involves the need for ob-
jectivity in inquiry. The other has to do with worries about activism that is uncritical or 
crass. 
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The question of objectivity in inquiry is deeply important in philosophy as in other fields 
and arenas in life. It is clear that in a court case, objectivity is necessary for justice, in the 
sense that if the judge has an interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of the case, 
the situation casts doubt on his or her judgment. Justice demands objectivity.12 Inquiry does 
too. People who have an interest in the tobacco industry or in selling gasoline are subject 
to motivations not to disclose their own internal findings if those suggest conclusions that 
would diminish profits. They might also with their considerable revenues be inclined to 
fund research that leads to the conclusion that their products bear important benefits or 
are less harmful or worrisome than objective study would show. 
Some scholars have argued that when philosophers “apply ethics” they are really just pre-
senting arguments that favor their own inclinations.13 In so doing, Gerald Gaus claims, 
they are therefore not really being philosophical, but just appear philosophical given their 
writing style and footnotes. Even worse, he charges, in applying ethics, philosophers “suc-
ceed in corrupting philosophy.”14 I have argued against Gaus’s claims in depth elsewhere.15 
Gaus is critical of the Pragmatist’s outlook, though he doesn’t specifically name that tradi-
tion. He thinks attending to the practical consequences of ideas means that we choose to 
believe what we want to believe, thereby, rather than what the evidence really shows. Gaus 
translates this claim to the idea that any motivated reasoning is suspect. The problem I see 
is in Gaus’s narrow conception of philosophy and his dismissal of motivated reasoning as 
being thereby of no value for serious objective inquiry. A parent may be able to articulate 
crucially important reasons why his or her child needs medical treatment and why the 
insurance company’s denial of coverage is fallaciously argued, even if his or her attorney 
could more easily present the argument dispassionately. In other words, in attending so 
centrally to motivations for reasoning, Gaus commits the ad hominem fallacy. The fact of 
motivation for inquiry does not render one’s judgment useless or unphilosophical. Making 
philosophical arguments is not the same as being a final Supreme Court arbiter. A child of 
a parent who dies of breast cancer may be highly motivated to find a cure, but interest and 
passion are not inherently biasing in a problematic way. Interests do not necessarily dictate 
12  Here it may be worth noting that by objectivity here, I do not mean a lack of emotion. For, as 
Aristotle rightly argued, I believe, sympathy can be essential for good judgment, which he refers to 
as “sympathetic judgment” in book XI of the Nicomachean Ethics. Sympathy can be what objectivity 
demands in a given case. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (New York: Oxford World Classics, 2009), 
book XI.  
13  Gerald Gaus, “Should Philosophers ‘Apply Ethics’?” Think 3, no. 9 (Spring 2005): 63–68.
14  Ibid., 63.
15  Eric Thomas Weber, “On Applying Ethics: Who’s Afraid of Plato’s Cave?” Contemporary 
Pragmatism 7, Issue 2 (December 2010): 91–103.
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which approach to treating breast cancer will appear more likely to be successful. And, for 
a Pragmatist, the idea of studying matters for which no value for life is intelligible might 
well mean the gross misuse of public resources that could instead support work that ben-
efits life. No one should give me a grant to count the number of discrete fibers in my rug, 
and fortunately no one will. But my absurd rug project, according to some philosophers, 
would be a more objective project than the personally motivated scientist studying breast 
cancer. So much the worse for that conception of objectivity, says the Pragmatist. 
The more important critique of activism among scholars targets uncritical engagement 
undertaken under the guise of academic activity by association. When a person is granted 
a Ph.D., the world begins to refer to her or him with the honorific prefix, “Doctor.” Simi-
larly, “Professor” refers to someone taken to be an authority at least of some scope. It is very 
tempting, even unintentionally to use one’s position to influence others about some matter 
over which one is not really educated. 
I witnessed a science professor, who was the faculty advisor to a student organization with 
interest related to gun control, make flatly false claims in a public forum about gun safety 
policy and law concerning gun rights on campus. He acted as an activist promoting gun 
rights, which could in itself be an acceptable thing to do. In his case, however, he insisted 
that it was not against the law to have guns on campus at the University of Mississippi. He 
was in a faculty position, weighing in as if his statements were authoritative and as a profes-
sor advising students, and he was clearly wrong. I know this because of the arrests that were 
publicized involving Klansmen who were charged in 2015 with “possessing a firearm in a 
school zone,” when they were found to have “guns in a truck parked on the University of 
Mississippi campus.”16 The relevant professor’s expertise was in a field entirely unconnected 
with gun rights. He failed to demonstrate confirmable expertise, references to sources from 
which one could learn more, and a level-headed attitude to discourse about a matter for 
which his role was advisory to students. This particular instance is an example of a broader 
pattern of behavior in which this professor wielded leadership influence over students, did 
so in a college setting and in a manner that was publicly communicative, and about matters 
of public policy relevant to the context of higher education and student safety. 
One more example is worth noting here. In 2017, when Tommy Curry was a professor 
at Texas A&M University, he received criticism from his university’s President17 as well as 
16  Jeff Amy and Emily Wagster Pettus, “Feds: KKK Members Charged With Having Guns on Ole 
Miss Campus,” The Clarion Ledger, October 27, 2015, URL: https://www.clarionledger.com/story/
news/2015/10/27/feds-kkk-members-charged-having-guns-ole-miss-campus/74670768/. 
17  Steve Kuhlmann, “Texas A&M Philosophy Professor Criticized for Race Comments in 5-year-old 
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over 80 death threats18 for an interview that he gave five years before on the Rod Redding 
podcast. He had been invited to talk about the ideas of racial violence that were raised in 
the movie Django Unchained. Jaime Foxx had made a joke on Saturday Night Live about 
the fantasy of killing slave owners and Redding asked Curry about it. Curry’s comments 
were essentially communicating the fact that when black men and women talk about 
racial violence, even in cases of self-defense, it is taken as an affront. The American Con-
servative, an online publication that featured the writings of white supremacists such as 
Richard Spencer, misinterpreted Curry’s work as a call for racial violence, a claim that 
was clearly undercut on Snopes.com19 as well as in The Chronicle of Higher Education.20 
Unfortunately, Curry’s university President at the time, Michael K. Young, failed to in-
quire into the white supremacist sources that motivated him to call Curry’s comments 
“disturbing” and “in stark contrast to Aggie [(members of the Texas A&M community)] 
core values – most notably those of respect and excellence, leadership and integrity – val-
ues that we hold true toward all of humanity.”21 In this case, what we see is not an instance 
of a faculty member engaged in crass activism, but rather university administration tak-
en in by politically biased, white supremacist organizations and voices, disregarding the 
expertise of the professor, who was hired precisely for the specialty he was exercising in 
the interview. Leadership that is publicly communicative, even when presented as if it 
aims to advance democratic values, can be misled or misleading, and can aim to rebuke 
wise public engagement. President Young’s actions were at least negligent of the respect 
that was due to his faculty member. Most people would not call his actions activism, yet 
critics of the U.S. Supreme Court criticize judges as “activist” when they interpret the 
judges as advancing an agenda. If one could make a case for a pattern of Young’s behavior 
that sought to make certain scholars feel unwelcome at the university, that pattern could 
Podcast,” The Eagle (Bryan, TX), May 11, 2017, https://www.theeagle.com/news/local/texas-a-m-
philosophy-professor-criticized-for-race-comments-in/article_7b7cc350-9c18-538b-a5fe-7f5410144691.
html. 
18  Weber, Eric Thomas, Anthony Cashio, and Tommy J. Curry, “The Public Philosopher and the 
Gadfly,” Philosophy Bakes Bread, Episode 32, Transcribed by Drake Boling, WRFL Lexington 88.1 
FM, Lexington, KY, July 11, 2017, https://www.philosophersinamerica.com/2017/08/05/036-ep32-the-
public-philosopher-and-the-gadfly/
19  Bethania Palma, “Did a Texas A&M Professor Advocate Killing White People?” Snopes.com, June 2, 
2017, https://www.snopes.com/news/2017/06/02/texas-professor-white-people/. 
20  Steve Kolowich, “Tough Talk: Who’s Left to Defend Tommy,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
July 26, 2017, https://www.chronicle.com/article/Who-s-Left-to-Defend-Tommy/240757. 
21  Colleen Flaherty, “Furor over Philosopher’s Comments on Violence Against White People,” 
InsideHigherEd.com, May 11, 2017, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/11/furor-over-
texas-am-philosophers-comments-violence-against-white-people. 
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be labeled as a kind of crass or undemocratic activism. Young was negligent in failing to 
investigate matters carefully and with proper respect for Curry. This case demonstrates 
activism done right, on Curry’s part, and wrongheaded criticism of activism, on the part 
of President Young. 
My aim here is not to focus on examples, nor to propose particular sanctions for profes-
sors or administrators. After all, freedom of expression is quite important and some-
times valuable even when people are wrong or offensive.22 At the same time, troubling 
instances can help us to appreciate why some people might have cause to be concerned 
about activism. Professors and administrators in higher education are role models for 
some. They are afforded a significant amount of trust in their interactions with students. 
They are offered resources on which to draw for scholarship. Those fortunate to have 
the financial and job security of tenure, especially at state institutions, are members of 
a community that has a corresponding obligation to attend to the ways in which they 
wield their influence. 
Philosopher John Lachs has argued that great teachers are the ones willing to offer them-
selves as examples to others. If we encourage others to act and to speak, professors should 
expect the same of ourselves. When we do so, however, we should put our best efforts 
into demonstrating the virtues of intelligent inquiry and communication. Lachs writes, 
How does one create or contribute to the development of human beings? By caring 
enough to offer oneself as a model students can imitate. That, in fact, is the heart of good 
teaching, and is not nearly as egomaniacal as it sounds. Good teachers don’t have to be, 
and should not think they are, perfect in any aspect of life. No one is, and there is no 
reason to impose unreasonable demands on people. They just have to be good enough to 
be living embodiments of a standard worth attaining.23 
Anyone can fall short of the reasonable call to action that Lachs presents here. I regret 
some of my own overstatements, for example.24 That said, if we expect perfection, Lachs 
22  Shane Courtland offers a strong defense of offensive speech in his essay, “The Necessity of Offense,” 
in Donald Alexander Downs and Chris W. Surprenant, The Value and Limits of Academic Speech: 
Philosophical, Political, and Legal Perspectives (London: Routledge Press, 2018), 155-166.
23  John Lachs, “Teaching as a Calling,” in A Community of Individuals (London: Routledge Press, 
2003), 17. 
24  Eric Thomas Weber, “Trump’s Popular Slogans Will Not Be Enough to Win Him the Primary 
Election: Weber,” The Tehran Times, November 2, 2015, 1, http://ericthomasweber.org/trumps-slogans-
not-enough-to-win/. I was amazed to find out how wrong I was about some of the things that Americans 
would find popular. The lesson has affected me deeply, but also has opened my eyes to some harsh 
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notes, our expectations are too high. Thus, if professors are going to try to be models for 
others, in inquiry as in activism, we ought both to be patient with our occasional missteps 
yet dogged in our efforts to offer examples worth emulating. The next section will focus 
on what good, judicious activism can look like in higher education. 
What is judicious activism and why does democracy demand it in education?
The converse of uncritical activism I call judicious activism. The term comes from the def-
inition I proposed for desirable leadership in Democracy and Leadership. There, I called 
good leadership “judicious yet courageous guidance.”25 Courage is an essential virtue of 
good leadership, I believe, because it is enabling. Knowing what is right and saying noth-
ing as the community follows foolish leaders means that knowledge or wisdom, unac-
companied by courage, does little good. Activism is conceptually enabled in its engage-
ment. The question is whether or not it is wise, or as I would say, judicious. For Plato, 
Socrates in the Republic chiefly touts the centrality of wisdom for leadership. But, even 
there wisdom must be accompanied by further virtues, including courage, moderation, 
and justice. In Democracy and Leadership, I propose that we use the word judicious to 
capture the three virtues that accompany courage, namely wisdom, moderation, and jus-
tice. It is in this context that I argue that judicious activism is both defensible in higher 
education and necessary for democracy. The activism I have in mind should be guided by 
wisdom, moderation, and justice. 
What does it mean for activism in higher education to be guided by wisdom? For one 
thing, it should either be related to matters connected to one’s intellectual expertise or it 
should be informed by the careful inquiry that academia should strive to foster in stu-
dents. In “Philosophy and Public Policy,” Sidney Hook presented four ideas about what 
philosophers have to contribute to public policy debates. Elsewhere, I have added three 
further contributions that philosophers have to offer.26 The first, Hook points out, is the 
kind of careful attention to the facts and best available information that any intelligent, 
careful person and community member should strive to know. Second, philosophers can 
be clarifying, offering methodological sophistication that “sharpens the issues at point 
realities. 
25  Eric Thomas Weber, Democracy and Leadership: On Pragmatism and Virtue (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2013), 18. 
26  Eric Thomas Weber, “On Applying Ethics: Who’s Afraid of Plato’s Cave?” Contemporary 
Pragmatism 7, Issue 2 (December 2010), 91-103.  
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in public controversy.”27 Third, philosophers can disentangle different kinds of claims for 
analysis. Fourth, Hook explains, philosophers can “make explicit the ethical issues behind 
conflicting public policies and to relate them to the kind of society in which we want to 
live and to the kind of men and women we wish to see nurtured in such a society.”28 Fifth, 
I add that in our analysis of claims and assumptions that different people make in policy 
debates, philosophers can identify matters of what John Rawls has called “overlapping 
consensus,” common ground despite other differences. Sixth, philosophers could con-
tribute substantively to argumentation about agenda setting, such as in the ways in which 
utilitarian thinking can argue for which sets of matters might make the biggest positive 
difference for the largest number of people. Deontologists have been useful in thinking 
about fundamental rights and obligations. Virtue ethicists have pointed to important mat-
ters for habit formation and character development that could guide educational agenda 
setting, if only it were wisely led. Seventh, philosophers are exceptionally good at creative 
rethinking, reconceptualization, a kind of reframing of ideas when old or outmoded prin-
ciples no longer suffice for present problems. My point in revisiting such lists is first of all 
that philosophers and other scholars have much to offer and that there are ways in which 
they can contribute to enhancing the wisdom of public discourse. These examples so far 
of ways of contributing point to some of the specialties that philosophers have to offer for 
the sake of wisdom, but they also point to contributions with respect to moderation.
It is worth recalling that in the Republic, Plato’s Socrates argues that moderation is an es-
sential virtue for the good city. Without it, fractures would grow more extreme and the 
city would be torn in two, with each part at war with the other. Moderation achieved with 
excellence yields unity. Philosophers and other scholars can help to humanize people who 
are caricatured. We can look to underlying assumptions across political divides to note 
what is valued in common even in disagreements as heated as the topic of abortion.29 
Philosophers also can contribute to thinking about standards of knowledge and evidence, 
considering sources and claims that people propose. Sometimes people might be wrong 
about science, such as in climate change denial, but right about the human worries people 
have about loss of jobs and the call for addressing out-of-work families’ needs. 
As Hook noted, philosophers can attend to ethics and justice. The principle of academ-
ic charity is too infrequently invoked in the public sphere. Trying to understand where 
27  Sidney Hook, “Philosophy and Public Policy,” The Journal of Philosophy 67, Issue 14 (1970): 461-
470, 467. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Bertha Alvarez Manninen, Pro-Life, Pro-Choice: Shared Values in the Abortion Debate (Nashville, 
TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014). 
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someone is coming from is a skill that most good teachers learn early. At the same time, 
philosophers can help to raise the bar about matters that involve the inhumane treatment 
of others. 
Judicious activism in general is informed by the facts and embodied in action taken 
to advance the common good, through measures that are themselves moral. As such, 
philosophers and other scholars could inform activist communications in ways that call 
attention to crucially important values and social goods. They can fight to make schools, 
colleges, and universities more inclusive, inviting, and welcoming of people who have 
traditionally been excluded. Sometimes that means that scholars need to work on each 
others’ attitudes about disability and underrepresented scholarly traditions. After all, 
while the proportion of women studying philosophy has risen significantly over the last 
30 years, the percentage of African American professional philosophers in the United 
States is still around 2 %.30 Disability is still underrepresented and researched in the acad-
emy, and countless concerns could be addressed humanely, with care, compassion, and 
rigor, yet communicated accessibly in public engagement. These tasks are hard, and so 
the indifferent or those inexperienced in employing accessible communication at times 
belittle those who venture into dialogue with the public. Cultures can change, however, 
even if slowly and over a long period of time. Scholars can contribute wisely, with in-
formed, careful argumentation and the pursuit of the common good and justice in mind. 
While judicious activism should be considered acceptable, it is also in some ways called 
for in the very act of democratic education, especially in public institutions, or in any of 
our higher educational institutions that are granted the benefits of not-for-profit status. 
These institutions all are expected to advance the common good. And, such institutions 
that accept any kind of federal dollars in the United States are expected not to discrimi-
nate. But, can black students at the University of Mississippi expect a quality education 
will be made available to them with equal respect as others receive if the Confederate 
Battle Flag is featured in the canton of the state flag that flew on campus? A Louisiana 
parish was convinced that a black death row inmate could not expect a fair trial in a 
courthouse over which the Confederate Battle Flag was flying.31 
30  The American Philosophical Association, “Demographic Statistics on the APA Membership, FY2016 
to FY2018,” URL: https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.apaonline.org/resource/resmgr/data_on_profession/
fy2018-demographic_statistic.pdf. Of 8,266 members of the APA, 127 were Black/African-American in 
2018, or 1.53%. 
31  John Simerman, “Confederate Flag Plays Major Role in Shreveport Death Penalty Challenge,” The 
Times-Picayune and The New Orleans Advocate on NOLA.com, May 10, 2011, URL: https://www.nola.
com/news/crime_police/article_94d86fff-c5cb-5e33-b178-5bf4b4e1bacc.html. 
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By the same token, how can a student feel comfortable taking a class or meeting with 
faculty who will treat them fairly when they have to meet them in buildings named after 
white supremacists who advocated explicitly for lynching all “negroes” for the sake of 
white supremacy, as in Vardaman Hall, named after just such a Mississippi Governor?32 
Teaching in a democratic society, in which all students are supposed to be respected as 
pupils and scholars cannot mean enabling some students to dehumanize their peers. 
When a male student shouts down a female student, professors have a duty to address 
the behavior in question. As the title of Howard Zinn’s autobiography puts it, You Can’t 
Be Neutral on a Moving Train.33 To strive to educate all students to the best of your ability 
brings with it the task of empowerment of all of them, empowerment of all the people, 
which is precisely part of what democracy demands, especially democratic education. 
Thus, the democratic educator should be at least minimally engaged in a kind of demo-
cratic activism that his or her job requires. 
Countless references could be offered for examples of publicly engaged scholars demon-
strating judicious activism, supported by wisdom, and pursuing moderation and justice. 
Instead of offering a laundry list, I have focused here on the principle and the call for 
such action. At the same time, John Dewey argued for a more robust kind of expectation 
in his powerful speech delivered before the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science in 1934, “The Supreme Intellectual Obligation.” I will turn to and conclude 
with Dewey’s call now. 
The Supreme Intellectual Obligation
Elsewhere,34 I have written about public philosophy drawing on Dewey’s address before 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “The Supreme Intellectual 
Obligation.” For my present purposes, it is worth revisiting that essay to highlight the 
extent to which the publicly engaged philosophy that Dewey would call for could be 
understood to be a kind of activism. 
In that essay, Dewey argues essentially that the chief intellectual obligation is to ensure 
that inquiry be put to use for the benefit of humanity. I argued previously about the 
32  Adam Ganucheau, “Ole Miss Will Rename Vardaman Hall, Place Plaques to Put ‘Past Into Context’,” 
Mississippi Today, July 6, 2017, URL: https://mississippitoday.org/2017/07/06/ole-miss-will-rename-
vardaman-hall-contexualize-other-sites/. 
33  Howard Zinn, You Can’t Be Neutral on a Moving Train (New York: Beacon Press, 2002). 
34  Eric Thomas Weber, “Lessons from America’s Public Philosopher,” The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 29, Issue 1 (2015): 118-135.
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implications of such a view, concerning the consequent need for publicly engaged philo-
sophical scholarship. Advocates for public philosophy sometimes argue that it is essential 
for scholars to avoid jargon and to be accessible to the public. It is true sometimes that 
such changes in vocabulary, language, and audience are important, but in fact Dewey in 
his essay notes that much great scholarship may well be necessary and be well pursued 
among specialists and technicians who will use impenetrable jargon, at least for the rest 
of us. That said, the insights that they develop leave people suffering from whatever they 
could have informed for the public benefit if they are not put to use for humanity. In oth-
er words, it may be that some of the chemistry of water supplies and agriculture will be 
complicated and above the heads of most Americans, yet the insights about how to pro-
mote health and clean drinking water ought to be brought to bear on the development of 
new water systems and the improvement of failing ones.35 At the same time, chemists are 
not necessarily trained in public advocacy. Therefore, philosophers and other scholars 
whom Dewey famously called “liaison officers” are needed to enable translation and to 
put the insights of the arts and sciences to work for the public benefit.36 
In his essay, Dewey argued that while new insights and technological developments of-
ten bring new problems, part of the supreme intellectual obligation is the call constantly 
to be working on applying inquiry to the alleviation of the new problems that past inqui-
ries and advances have caused. Inquiry is never over or done, as a result. In addition to 
this consequence, Dewey noted a crucially important aspect of the supreme intellectual 
obligation, which is that if the masses, the wider population, are poorly educated about 
the sciences and civic arts, then they may well be unable to take advantage of the benefits 
of new insights and advances. This then means that the supreme intellectual obligation 
necessitates advocacy, a kind of activism, for ensuring that all people have the tools as 
well as the habits of mind and intellectual attitudes necessary for appreciating wisdom 
and putting it to use. That is no small task, and far too often, the elite scholar in the ivory 
tower thinks that the Plebe in the streets is a distraction and a nuisance in the way of 
his or her work, clogging up traffic and valuable time. Such scholars, furthermore, often 
inexperienced in speaking to persons with less than some college education feel that they 
35  Here, of course, I have in mind conditions of the water in Flint, Michigan. See Emma Winowiecki, 
“Does Flint Have Clean Water? Yes, but It’s Complicated,” Michigan Radio, Michigan’s NPR News 
Leader (michiganradio.org), August 21, 2019, URL: https://www.michiganradio.org/post/does-flint-
have-clean-water-yes-it-s-complicated. 
36  See for example Danielle Lake and Paul Thompson, “Philosopher-as-Liaison? Lessons from 
Sustainable Knowledge and American Philosophy,” Dewey Studies 2, Issue 1 (2018): 10-41, URL: 
http://www.johndeweysociety.org/dewey-studies/files/2018/09/03_DS_2.1.pdf. 
Weber | The Pragmatist's Call to Democratic Activism 
www.pdcnet.org/eip  44
are debasing themselves to translate their research into digestible chicken nuggets, from 
which all nutrition has been extracted in processing. 
Two things are important to note in Dewey’s argument. The first is that not all scholars 
are called to be public philosophers or public intellectuals. There certainly are plenty 
who would do best just sequestering themselves and focusing on the work to which they 
can valuably contribute. If they are teachers, where called for, one hopes that their abili-
ties to talk with non-specialists would be refined, but nevertheless, the point is that not 
everyone must engage the wider public beyond our classrooms in higher education. The 
second consequence of Dewey’s argument is that, if he’s right, intellectuals all should see 
as part of their task advocacy for a strong and high quality public education, education 
for all, such that people can maximally benefit from the greatest wisdom available. 
There are those who deny the importance of education37 and of democracy.38 The authors 
of such arguments may not agree about the importance of advocating for education and 
for democracy, but Dewey elsewhere argued that even they contribute something impor-
tant. In “Social Absolutism,” Dewey writes that: 
… it may be that the best thing which can happen to the ideal of democracy is 
to be put on the defensive. For then it will no longer remain a vague optimism, 
a weak benevolent aspiration, at the mercy of favorable circumstances. It may 
become a compact, aggressive and realistic intelligence directing circumstance.39
Even if there is need for room for people to disagree about activist causes, there can 
nevertheless be a demand for intellectuals to strive to put wisdom to use for the benefit 
of humanity. The existence of white supremacists doesn’t change the fact that universi-
ties are meant to be open for and respectful of all – i.e. that they should be. Therein we 
find one of the strongest causes for activism in higher education. The very enterprise it 
is meant to advance requires that sources of insight be understood to come from any-
where. It calls for recognizing the powers in people and cultivating them to new heights. 
Dewey’s cry demands both that we pursue knowledge with the aim of improving people’s 
lives and that we ensure that findings obtained are made operable in life and policy, 
either by the specialists guided and overseen or through the hands of experts who can 
37  I have already mentioned Caplan, The Case Against Education. 
38  Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
39  John Dewey, “Social Absolutism,” in The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works, 
Volume 13, Edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 
315–316.
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communicate accessibly with fellow citizens, both sharing insights and gaining them 
through exchanges with the public. 
In this essay, I have emphasized higher education and philosophy as domains for poten-
tially rich contributions to grow in judicious activism. The reasons for that are that high-
er education remains a special environment, in which individuals can still often pursue 
inquiries of their choosing or that are not only motivated by a particular corporation’s 
interests. It is also a venue offering rich resources not presently available to everyone. 
And, some fortunate among us are granted the time, resources, and job security of tenure 
to think and write. We lucky few should feel a corresponding duty to make the richest 
use of that privilege possible for enhancing the lives of people whose tax dollars fund 
our public employee salaries and retirement accounts. Yes, we teach students, one of 
the obvious first lines of public engagement that scholars participate in through college 
courses. But we can see our work as the calling that it long has been considered. In higher 
education, the faculty are professors for a reason. We must profess a faith in the potential 
for democratic inquiry to advance the well-being of lives in and beyond our academies, 
and exhibit the courage to advocate for such progress as a part of our shared mission.
